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I. INTRODUCTION
VER the past year, the Supreme Court of the United States and
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decided several cases con-
cerning confessions, searches, and seizures.1 Some cases clari-
fied established law, while others took the respective courts'
jurisprudence in new directions. In two parts, this article reviews the
most significant cases decided during this survey period: (1) confessions
and (2) searches and seizures. In each part, the article identifies the areas
of confession and search-and-seizure law that the recently decided cases
*Michael E. Keasler is a judge on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
** Michael J. Ritter is the law clerk for Judge Michael E. Keasler. He earned his J.D.
with honors from The University of Texas School of Law in 2010 and his B.A. cum laude
from Trinity University in 2007.
1. Unless context suggests otherwise, "Supreme Court" refers to the Supreme Court
of the United States, "Court of Criminal Appeals" refers to the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, and "State" refers generally to prosecuting entities of the State of Texas.
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have implicated; discusses the respective courts' opinions in those cases;
and analyzes the cases' significance to the law of Texas.
II. CONFESSIONS
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, made applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 provides that "no person...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."'3
This provision embodies a privilege against self-incrimination, 4 which, as
the Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona,5 requires the authorities
to inform suspects of their right to remain silent and their right to counsel
prior to custodial interrogation.6 A suspect may waive his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to counsel, 7 but any statement
made after a waiver will be admissible at trial only if the government
proves that the suspect waived his rights voluntarily, knowingly, and in-
telligently.8 The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure contains provisions
guaranteeing similar rights and prescribing the possibility of a waiver of
these rights. 9 Another aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination is
the freedom from prosecutors' remarks on a defendant's decision not to
testify.10
The significant confession cases in 2011 involved issues concerning cus-
tody of juvenile suspects, waiver, and appropriate standards of appellate
review for issues regarding a prosecutor's improper remarks on a defen-
dant's failure to testify.
A. CUSTODY OF JUVENILES
When determining whether a juvenile subjected to police questioning is
in custody for purposes of Miranda, the Supreme Court held in 2011 that
a child's age properly informs the analysis. In J.D.B. v. North Carolina,1
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the Supreme
Court of North Carolina erred by failing to consider the age of the juve-
nile suspect when considering whether he was in custody.12
A uniformed police officer removed J.D.B., a thirteen-year-old middle-
school student, from a social studies class and escorted him to a closed-
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; accord Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (incorpo-
rating privilege against self-incrimination); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96
(1969) (incorporating protection against double jeopardy).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V; accord J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2410
(2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting the Fourteenth Amendment's application of the Fifth
Amendment protections to the states).
4. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (noting the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination).
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6. Id. at 467-70.
7. See id. at 475-76 (discussing the possibility of the waiver of these rights).
8. Id. at 444-45.
9. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 38.21, 38.22, 38.23 (West 2006).
10. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
11. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
12. Id. at 2398-99.
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door conference room in the school.' 3 In the conference room, an inves-
tigator questioned J.D.B. about several break-ins around a neighborhood
where J.D.B. had been seen hanging about.t 4 J.D.B. was not informed of
his Miranda rights or that he was free to leave. 15 After learning that he
might be placed in juvenile detention, J.D.B. confessed to the break-ins
and committed his statement to writing.16
Following the filing of two juvenile petitions, both charging J.D.B. with
breaking and entering and larceny, J.D.B. filed motions to suppress his
statements on the grounds that the police obtained them through a custo-
dial interrogation at which the police failed to give Miranda warnings to
J.D.B. 17 The trial court denied the motions, and J.D.B. was adjudicated
delinquent. 18 On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed
the judgment, declining to consider J.D.B.'s age when concluding that
J.D.B. was not in custody when he confessed. 19
The Supreme Court reversed,20 holding that a suspect's age is an objec-
tive circumstance affecting how the suspect would perceive his freedom
to leave. 2' "That is, a reasonable child subjected to police questioning
will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would
feel free to go."22 The majority relied upon three primary rationales to
support its holding. First, the majority cited Supreme Court opinions in
other contexts acknowledging that children lack the maturity, responsibil-
ity, experience, perspective, judgment, and resolve of adults. 23 Second,
the majority cited the common-law doctrine of reasonableness in a negli-
gence action as an example of how the law treats children and adults
differently. 24 And third, the majority used the facts of the case sub judice
to demonstrate the absurdity of ignoring a school-child's age when ana-
lyzing what a reasonable person of average age would believe under the
circumstances of being removed from a social studies class. 25
J.D.B. is jurisprudentially significant not only because it offers gui-
dance to lower courts' custody analyses, but also because it continues the
Supreme Court's trend toward juvenile leniency. 26 However, the major-








20. Id. at 2408.
21. Id. at 2402-03, 2406.
22. Id. at 2403.
23. Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion)).
24. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2404.
25. Id. at 2405.
26. See Michael J. Ritter, Just (Juvenile Justice) Jargon: An Argument for Terminologi-
cal Uniformity Between the Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 221,
226-27 (2010) (discussing the Supreme Court's trend in the 1960s toward being "more
protective of juveniles' rights and interests"); see also J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2405.
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affects a custody analysis under Miranda only if "the child's age was
known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have
been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer."'2 7 Second, careful not
to overstate the significance of a child's age, the majority cautioned,
"[t]his is not to say that a child's age will be a determinative, or even a
significant, factor in every case."' 28 On a practical level, J.D.B.'s holding
enables defense counsel to present evidence regarding a juvenile-client's
age and surrounding circumstances that would make the juvenile-client's
age apparent to a reasonable officer, as well as to argue that the juvenile-
client's age is significant to a custody analysis.
B. WAIVER
The Court of Criminal Appeals further developed confession law in the
waiver of Miranda and statutory rights regarding statements made during
custodial interrogation. In Leza v. State,29 the Court of Criminal Appeals
overruled Armando Leza's challenges under the Fifth Amendment and
article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to the admissibility
of his video-recorded confession, which was obtained during a police in-
terrogation where "[Leza] was not informed of the true object of the in-
terrogation and was under the influence of heroin. '30
The court held that neither circumstance rendered his waiver involun-
tary, unintelligent, or unknowing under Miranda or article 38.22.31 The
court rejected Leza's first argument-that the interrogating officers' fail-
ure to inform him that they were questioning him about a murder, rather
than his outstanding traffic warrant, rendered his waiver involuntary
under the Fifth Amendment. 32 It noted that the Supreme Court had al-
ready rejected this argument when it proposed that a suspect need not be
aware of all possible subjects of questioning prior to waiving his Miranda
rights.33 The Leza court also noted that Leza was expressly informed that
"anything" he said could be used against him. 34 Finally, the court rea-
soned that it must have been obvious to Leza immediately after he re-
ceived his Miranda warnings that the police wanted to question him
about the murder rather than the traffic warrant.35
The court then rejected Leza's second argument-that his being on
heroin rendered his confession inadmissible under Miranda. First, the
court noted that as a matter of law, his use of heroin could not render his
waiver involuntary without official intimidation, coercion, or deception,
27. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2406.
28. Id.
29. Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
30. Id. at 349.
31. See id. at 347 (finding Leza's arguments without merit).
32. Id. at 350.
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and Leza's voluntary heroin use implicated none of these.3 6 Second, the
court deferred to the trial court's findings, which were supported by the
record, that despite Leza's testimony regarding his heroin use, Leza ap-
peared to be awake, alert, and able to comprehend the warnings and
questions asked.37
The court rejected Leza's arguments that these same two circumstances
also resulted in a violation of article 38.22's requirements that the accused
"knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive[ I the rights set out in the
warning. '38 Its reasoning for rejecting the argument regarding the failure
to expressly inform Leza of the purposes of the interrogation at the out-
set mirrored its reasoning for rejecting the argument under Miranda.39
However, the court noted that a waiver under article 38.22 did not re-
quire police overreaching and that intoxication can be a factor in the in-
voluntariness inquiry. 40 The court held that the trial record supported
the conclusion that Leza's "heroin intoxication, if any, at the beginning of
the interview when his statutory rights were read to him and the interro-
gation began, was not so acute as to overcome his capacity to resist rea-
sonable, noncoercive tactics by the police to persuade him to waive his
statutory rights."'4 1 Finally, citing Barefield v. State for the proposition
that a waiver of statutory rights can be inferred from a suspect's con-
duct,42 the court rejected Leza's final argument that his waiver of statu-
tory rights needed to be express and video-recorded. 43
Although Leza did not substantially change confession law in Texas, it
did affirm important principles regarding the relevance of a suspect's in-
toxication before and during custodial interrogation. First, it reaffirmed
that a suspect's voluntary intoxication will not render a waiver involun-
tary for Fifth Amendment purposes. But it can be significant to a trial
judge's determination of whether his waiver is knowing and intelligent.
Second, it restated that for purposes of article 38.22, intoxication is rele-
vant to a trial court's voluntariness inquiry. If, however, the evidence
presented to the trial judge supports the conclusion that the suspect re-
tained his ability to resist reasonable and noncoercive tactics despite his
alleged intoxication, the trial judge is within her discretion to conclude
that the waiver was voluntary.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 351.
38. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22 (West 2006); accord Leza, 351 S.W.3d at
352, 354 (overruling Leza's second issue regarding Article 38.22).
39. Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 352 (rejecting Leza's Article 38.22 argument based on its prior
analysis under Miranda).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 352-53.
42. Barefield v. State, 784 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); accord Leza, 351
S.W.3d at 353.
43. Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 353-54.
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C. APPELLATE REVIEW OF COMMENTS ON A DEFENDANT'S
FAILURE TO TESTIFY
Two cases from the Court of Criminal Appeals in 2011 have addressed
the proper standard of review for a trial judge's ruling regarding a prose-
cutor's comments about a defendant's refusal to testify. In Archie v.
State,44 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Waco Court of Ap-
peals unreasonably applied an abuse-of-discretion standard when it re-
versed a trial judge's decision to deny Trent Archie's motion for mistrial,
which occurred after the prosecutor approached Archie during closing
argument and directly asked him questions.45 The Court of Criminal Ap-
peals determined that the prosecutor's conduct during closing argu-
ment-posing questions to the defendant, taking steps toward him, and
pointing at him-was improper because "the jury could only have con-
strued this as an invitation ... to consider [Archie]'s failure to testify. '46
Reviewing the three Mosley v. State factors-the severity of the mis-
conduct, the efficacy of the curative measures taken, and the certainty of
conviction absent the misconduct47-the court concluded that the court
of appeals erred in its analysis.48 The misconduct was not severe because
the questions posed to Archie "were embedded within other remarks that
invited the jury to draw ... legitimate inference[s] from" the evidence. 49
The court also noted several of the trial judge's curative measures, includ-
ing sustaining defense counsel's objection, instructing the prosecutor not
to ask Archie questions, instructing the jury to disregard the argument,
and instructing the jury in the charge regarding a defendant's right to
remain silent.50 Finally, the court detailed the evidence supporting
Archie's conviction and characterized it as compelling.5 1
Archie's significance is twofold. First, it provides an example of how a
prosecutor's statements and conduct during closing argument can consti-
tute an indirect comment on a defendant's failure to testify. Second, it
describes the proper application of the Mosley factors in cases in which
the prosecutor improperly comments on the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination. As to the first factor, the court emphasized that "the
question is not whether the prosecutor's improper questions during his
final argument had [adverse] consequences, but rather, the extent to
which they did."'5 2 The court elaborated on the relationship of the first
and second factors by requiring the consideration of whether the prosecu-
tor's improper statements were "so indelible that the jury would simply
44. Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
45. Id. at 741.
46. Id. at 740.
47. Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); accord Archie, 340
S.W.3d at 740-41.
48. Archie, 340 S.W.3d at 741.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 742.
52. Id.
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ignore the trial court's specific and timely instruction to disregard
them." 53
When a trial judge overrules a defendant's objection to a prosecutor's
improper comment regarding a defendant's refusal to testify, appellate
courts must consider whether the trial judge's constitutional error was
harmful. 54 In Snowden v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals consid-
ered what the proper harm analysis for constitutional errors was, such as
a prosecutor's improper remark on a defendant's failure to testify.5 5 Dur-
ing closing argument of the guilt-innocence phase of Rion Snowden's
trial, the prosecutor referred to Snowden's lack of remorse after he com-
mitted the offense and his lack of remorse at trial.56 The trial judge over-
ruled defense counsel's objection, and the Dallas Court of Appeals
reversed on direct appeal, considering the Harris v. State factors and con-
cluding that Snowden was harmed. 57
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals, disposed
of some of the Harris factors, recast other Harris factors as a list of
nonexclusive considerations for harm, and concluded that the trial judge's
error did not harm Snowden. Specifically, the court disagreed that the
first factor (the source of the trial court's error) and the last factor
(whether declaring the error harmless would encourage repetition of the
prosecutorial misconduct) were relevant to a proper harm analysis.58 The
court then determined that the remaining Harris factors-the nature of
the error, whether the State emphasized the result of the error, the likely
implications of the error, and the weight the jury likely would have as-
signed to it-could be relevant to a harm analysis insofar as the factors
logically applied to the particular constitutional error. 59
The Court of Criminal Appeals conceded in Snowden that the trial
judge erred in overruling Snowden's objection because the prosecutor's
remark commented on Snowden's failure to testify by highlighting
Snowden's failure to take the stand and express remorse.60 It disagreed
with the court of appeal's assessment of the error as including a large
portion of the closing argument because the improper remark was an iso-
lated reference to Snowden's failure to show remorse at trial.
61
53. Id.
54. Snowden v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
55. Id. at 817-18.
56. Id. at 817.
57. Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); accord Snowden, 353
S.W.3d at 817-18; see also Snowden v. State, No. 05-09-00652-CR, 2010 WL 2927472, at
*6-7 (Tex. App.-Dallas July 28, 2010, pet. granted) (not designated for publication) (stat-
ing the Harris factors as follows: "[T]he court should examine" (1) "the source of the er-
ror," (2) "the nature of the error," (3) "whether or to what extent it was emphasized by the
State," (4) "its probable collateral implications," (5) "the weight a juror would probably
place upon the error," and (6) "whether declaring the error harmless would encourage the
State to repeat it with impunity."), rev'd, 353 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
58. Snowden, 353 S.W.3d at 821-22.
59. Id. at 822.
60. Id. at 823-24.
61. Id. at 824.
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The court focused on whether the error "move[d] the jury from a state
of non-persuasion to a state of persuasion on any material issue in the
case" and was "reasonably likely to have caused such prejudice as to dis-
tract the jury or divert it from its proper fact-finding role," and then con-
cluded that the error was not harmful.62 The court reasoned that (1) the
illegitimate reference to Snowden's lack of remorse at trial was isolated
and never repeated or emphasized, (2) a jury believing that Snowden
lacked remorse at the time of the offense likely would not be substan-
tially prejudiced by a statement that Snowden lacked remorse at trial, and
(3) the case essentially turned on the credibility of the complainant and
whether she had a motive to testify falsely to retaliate against Snowden. 63
The court ultimately was "persuaded to a level of confidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that it made no contribution to the jury's determination
that [Snowden] was guilty."'64
Snowden is important because, like Archie, it provides an example of
an improper comment on a defendant's failure to testify and clarifies an
appellate standard of review. Unlike Archie, however, Snowden is a sig-
nificant change in the harm analysis for constitutional error that extends
beyond the Fifth Amendment context. It also provides an analytical
model for similar cases in which an appellant argues that a trial judge's
constitutional error was harmful.
III. SEARCHES & SEIZURES
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, made applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 65
In 2011, the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals decided
several cases involving police-citizen encounters, traffic stops, blood
draws, consent to search, exigent circumstances, and the exclusionary
rule.
A. POLICE-CITIZEN ENCOUNTERS
"Law enforcement and citizens engage in three distinct types of inter-
actions: (1) consensual encounters; (2) investigatory detentions; and (3)
arrests. Consensual police-citizen encounters do not implicate Fourth
Amendment protections. '66 Two cases decided by the Court of Criminal
62. Id. at 825.
63. Id. at 824-25.
64. Id. at 825.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; accord Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 369 (2003) (cit-
ing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)).
66. State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
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Appeals this past year held that Fourth Amendment protections were not
implicated.
In State v. Castleberry,67 Cory Castleberry and his friend were spotted
behind a closed business in a high crime area around 3 a.m. when a police
officer approached and asked them for identification and why they were
there.68 Castleberry reached for his waistband, and the officer told Cas-
tleberry to put his hands above his head.69 Castleberry reached a second
time for his waistband, and the officer took control of Castleberry's right
hand and instructed him to put his hands behind his back.70 Castleberry
reached a third time for his waistband, grabbed a "baggie" of cocaine,
and threw it on the ground.71 The officer then arrested Castleberry.
72
The State charged Castleberry with possession of cocaine. 73 During his
trial, Castleberry moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that reaching
for his waistband the first time did not create reasonable suspicion that
would permit the officer to detain him.74 The trial judge agreed and sup-
pressed the evidence. 75 The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
judge's ruling. 76
But the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the initial
interaction between the officer and Castleberry was a consensual encoun-
ter.77 The court's reasoning proceeded in three parts. First, it noted that
"an officer is just as free as anyone to question, and request identification
from, a fellow citizen."'78 Second, the uncontested facts that there was
"'quite a bit' of foot traffic" in the area and that the area was sufficiently
lit so that a flashlight was not needed to walk supported the fact "that a
reasonable person in Castleberry's shoes would have felt free to termi-
nate the encounter, making it consensual. ' ' 79 And third, the officer rea-
sonably believed under the circumstances that he was in danger because
Castleberry could have been reaching for a weapon in his waistband. 80
Consequently, the officer was permitted to conduct a limited pat down of
Castleberry.81 Alternatively, the court would have held that no seizure
occurred because Castleberry refused to yield to the officer's force or
show of authority. 82
67. State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
68. Id. at 462.




73. Id. at 462.
74. Id. at 462, 465.
75. Id. at 463.
76. Id. at 465.
77. Id. at 469.






In State v. Woodard, a police officer had responded to an anonymous
tip about a single-car accident when the officer found David Woodard
walking six to eight blocks away.8 3 The officer approached Woodard and
asked if he was involved in the accident. 84 Woodard responded affirma-
tively, and he admitted that he was "drunk and should not have been
driving."' 85 The officer then asked Woodard to perform field sobriety
tests, and the officer concluded that Woodard was intoxicated based on
the results.86 The officer arrested Woodard, and the State charged him
with driving while intoxicated. 87 The trial judge granted Woodard's mo-
tion to suppress.88 On direct appeal, the ruling was reversed.8 9
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals, concluding that the initial interaction between Woodard and the
officer was a consensual encounter-not a seizure. 90 Citing the general
proposition that police conduct is presumed proper, the court rejected
Woodard's argument that the court of appeals improperly placed the bur-
den on him to prove that the initial interaction was not a consensual en-
counter.91 The court thereby determined that the absence of details
surrounding the officer's interaction with Woodard (such as "whether he
was in uniform, exhibited a weapon, activated the patrol car's siren and
lights; whether he requested or demanded information; whether he used
a conversational tone or touched Woodard; whether other officers were
present") was to Woodard's detriment. 92 It also noted that the record did
not support the trial judge's conclusion "that a reasonable person in
Woodard's shoes would not have felt free to leave" when the officer ap-
proached him.93
Woodard also argued that, under article 14.01(b) of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, the officer was not permitted to conduct a warrant-
less arrest because the DWI offense did not occur in the officer's presence
or within his view. 94 The court rejected his argument and reasoned that
Woodard "voluntarily confirmed his involvement in the accident and then
confessed to driving while intoxicated." 95 The "totality of the informa-
tion" available to the officer was sufficient to support the officer's proba-
ble cause to arrest Woodard.96
83. State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
84. Id.




89. Id. at 409.
90. See id. at 414.
91. Id. at 413.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (West 2005); accord Woodard, 341
S.W.3d at 414 ("With the error now remedied, Woodard's complaint that Officer Warner
lacked personal knowledge, or reasonably trustworthy information, that Woodard commit-
ted the offense of DWI, as required by Article 14.01(b), becomes an academic exercise.").
95. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 414.
96. See id.
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In Castleberry and Woodard, the Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed
with the trial judges' respective conclusions that the police's questionings
of the defendants were not consensual encounters. While not new direc-
tions in Texas's consenual-encounters law these cases stress the impor-
tance of trial judges properly applying the law regarding consensual
encounters. Woodard's holding that it is the defendant's burden to over-
come the presumption of proper police conduct also emphasizes the ne-
cessity of producing evidence about the details surrounding the
interaction to support that an officer detained the defendant without rea-
sonable suspicion.
B. TRAFFIC STOPS
Although consensual police-citizen encounters do not invoke Fourth
Amendment protection, stopping and detaining an individual who is driv-
ing an automobile will ordinarily require an officer to use force or make a
showing of authority.97 Thus, a traffic stop usually requires probable
cause or reasonable suspicion to be considered a reasonable seizure.98
The following discusses several cases from this past year involving traffic
stops.
1. Reasonable Suspicion
Two of the Court of Criminal Appeal's reasonable-suspicion-for-traffic-
stop cases from the past year involved the police's reliance on informants
to detain suspects. In Derichsweiler v. State,99 the trial court concluded
that the police had reasonable suspicion to detain Mark Derichsweiler
based on an informant's tip.10 0 Derichsweiler pulled up next to a vehicle
in a McDonald's drive-thru lane and grinned at the occupants for up to a
minute.10 1 After the car pulled out of the drive-thru lane, Derichsweiler
continued to grin and stare at them for about fifteen to twenty seconds. 10 2
He then circled the McDonald's and once again grinned and stared at
them.10 3 The passengers of the car called 911, identified themselves, and
gave the dispatcher their contact information.10 4 They continued to de-
scribe Derichsweiler's behavior to the dispatcher as he pulled into a Wal-
Mart parking lot and continued the same behavior, but toward other cars'
passengers.1 0 5 Three police units responded and circled Derichsweiler's
97. See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007) ("The law is settled that in
Fourth Amendment terms a traffic stop entails a seizure of the driver 'even though the
purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.'" (quoting Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979))).
98. See id. at 255-56; Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650, 663.
99. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 150 (2011).
100. Id. at 912.
101. Id. at 909.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 910.
105. Id.
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car in the Wal-Mart parking lot.10 6
When an officer approached Derichsweiler's car, Derichsweiler rolled
down his window and the officer smelled a "strong odor" of alcohol com-
ing from inside the vehicle.' 0 7 The officer "began a DWI investigation
that culminated in [Derichsweiler's] prosecution."'01 8 Derichsweiler
moved to suppress the evidence based on the officer's lack of reasonable
suspicion to detain him.10 9 The trial judge denied the motion, but the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed. 110
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the officers had reasonable
suspicion to detain Derichsweiler."' Noting that there was no dispute as
to the reliability of the informants, the court concluded that the court of
appeals erred by suggesting that the facts "giv[ing] rise to a reasonable
suspicion must show that the detainee has committed, is committing, or is
about to commit, a particular and distinctively identifiable penal of-
fense. 11 2 It reasoned that "pinpoint[ing] a particular penal infraction" is
not a necessary component of reasonable suspicion because investigative
detentions are much less invasive "than .. . full-blown custodial ar-
rest[s]."" 3 The court further stated that the information procured by the
informants satisfied the standard that Derichsweiler's behavior was re-
lated to criminal activity; Derichsweiler's behavior reasonably suggested
that he "was looking to criminally exploit some vulnerability.""l 4
Conversely, in Martinez v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held
that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop John Martinez's vehi-
cle based on an informant's tip.115 The police responded to an anony-
mous tip that a male driving a blue Ford pickup truck stopped and put
two bicycles that had been left at an intersection in the back of his
truck." 6 An officer spotted Martinez's green Ford truck almost a mile
away from where the bikes were stolen." 7 The officer followed Martinez
"for four blocks without observing any traffic violations" before stopping
Martinez." 8 As the officer approached Martinez's truck, he observed
two bicycles in the bed.119 Martinez eventually was prosecuted for "driv-
ing while intoxicated... and possession of marijuana.' 120 The trial judge
denied his motions to suppress, and the San Antonio Court of Appeals
106. Id. at 910, n.7.
107. Id. at 910-11.
108. Id. at 911.
109. Id. at 909.
110. Id. at 912.
111. Id. at 917.
112. Id. at 916.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 917.
115. Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
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affirmed his conviction. 121
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. 122 It found it to be significant
that the informant, unlike the Derichsweiler informants, was anonymous
and gave no identification information to dispatch. 123 Moreover, the
court noted that the anonymous caller failed to "report contextual[izing]
factors that [would] reasonably connect[ ] the [reported] unusual" behav-
ior to criminal activity. 124 The court also explained that the arresting of-
ficer "had very little information, corroborated or otherwise, to connect"
the unusual behavior to criminal activity, and to connect Martinez to the
reported unusual behavior. 125 Lastly, the court compared the facts in
Martinez's case to the facts of Derichsweiler and determined that the of-
ficer "had significantly less, and less reliable, information."' 26
The court's analyses in Derichsweiler and Martinez illuminates the line
between reasonable suspicion and the lack of reasonable suspicion. The
court admitted that Derichsweiler was indeed "a close call" and that the
facts of the case almost fell below what was required to establish reasona-
ble suspicion.' 27 Martinez demonstrates that a reasonable-suspicion in-
quiry can be quite fact intensive. Important to the court's holding in
Martinez were the attenuations between the suspicious acts reported by
the anonymous caller to the criminal activity and between Martinez to
the reported suspicious acts. Derichsweiler is also distinguished from
Martinez by the lack of a reasonable explanation for Derichsweiler's odd
behavior, whereas Martinez's behavior was reasonably explainable ab-
sent additional information suggesting that it was indeed criminal (e.g.,
information suggesting that the bicycles did not belong to Martinez).
2. Vehicle Checkpoints
This past year, the Court of Criminal Appeals also upheld the constitu-
tionality of a vehicle checkpoint in Lujan v. State.128 Gerardo Lujan and
his passenger were stopped and detained at a vehicle checkpoint for fail-
ure to present a license. 129 The officers at the checkpoint determined
that Lujan's passenger had outstanding warrants for his arrest.130 The
officers placed Lujan's passenger in the back seat of a patrol car and in-
formed Lujan of the arrest.' 31 One officer informed Lujan that he was
going to pat him down for safety reasons. 32 After finding over $1,500 in
cash and noticing that Lujan behaved very nervously, the officer obtained
121. Id.
122. Id. at 926.
123. Id. at 924.
124. Id. at 925.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 926.
127. Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 917.
128. Lujan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 768, 773 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).





Lujan's consent to search the vehicle and discovered several bags of
drugs.133 After the trial judge denied his motion to suppress, Lujan
pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine.134 The El Paso Court of Appeals
reversed Lujan's conviction because the trial judge failed to grant his mo-
tion to suppress. 135
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals, 136 hold-
ing that, contrary to Lujan's contention and the court of appeal's conclu-
sion, the record supported the trial judge's implied finding that the
primary purpose of the vehicle checkpoint was to verify drivers' licenses
and vehicle registrations rather than to detect evidence of ordinary crimi-
nal wrongdoing. 137 The court reviewed the record and noted the signifi-
cance of the officers' testimony. 138 One officer testified that the purpose
of the checkpoint was to target unlicensed drivers and uninsured motor-
ists. 1 39 He denied having intent to check drivers' immigration statuses.140
Another officer testified that licensed and insured motorists were waived
through the checkpoint, but that the officers were checking for any viola-
tions they came across. 141 Because the trial court denied Lujan's motion
without any findings, the court concluded that the record supported an
implied finding that it resolved evidentiary inconsistencies in the State's
favor.1 42 After concluding that the primary purpose of the checkpoint
was lawful, the court held that the officers lawfully acted on information
that arose at the stop.143
Lujan does not represent a significant change in the Court of Criminal
Appeal's application of reasonable suspicion standards set forth by the
Supreme Court. However, it demonstrates the level of deference given to
the trial judge when he makes no findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Even when the testimony of the State's witnesses conflict, trial judges do
not abuse their discretion by denying a motion to suppress based on an
improper vehicle checkpoint so long as some evidence supports the con-
clusion that the primary purpose of the checkpoint was not generally to
detect ordinary criminal wrongdoing.
C. BLOOD DRAWS
The Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement for searches
and seizures may necessitate more specific inquiries in special contexts.
When a suspect is compelled to submit to a blood draw, for example, the
legality of the blood draw is determined by the two inquiries set out in
133. Id.
134. Id. at 771.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 773.
137. ld. at 772-73.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 772.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 772.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 773.
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Schmerber v. California: (1) whether the test chosen was reasonable and
(2) whether the test was performed in a reasonable manner.144 In State v.
Johnston, the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the reasonability of a
blood draw from Christi Johnston, a DWI suspect, to test her blood-alco-
hol content even though the police did not: (1) inquire into her medical
history, (2) comply with statutory procedures for conducting the blood
draw, (3) utilize a medical professional for the blood draw, or (4) conduct
the blood draw in a medical environment. 145
After outlining the two Schmerber inquiries, the court rejected John-
ston's argument under the first inquiry-that the venipuncture blood
draw was unreasonable because the police failed to inquire into her medi-
cal history. 146 Under Schmerber, such tests are presumptively reasonable
because, when used on the general population, they generally do not
"create an unjustified risk, trauma, or pain. '147 Rather, Johnston bore
the burden of showing that the venipuncture blood draw was unreasona-
ble and presenting evidence that she "suffer[ed] from a medical condition
that would have made another means of testing preferable. 148
Considering the second inquiry, the court rejected Johnston's argu-
ments that provisions of "the Transportation Code provide[d] the mini-
mum requirements ... for blood draws in assessing the reasonableness of
how the draw was performed under the Fourth Amendment. 1 149 The
reasonableness of a blood draw was purely a matter of Fourth Amend-
ment law, not statutory law.150 It also rejected Johnston's argument that,
to be reasonable, the search must have been conducted by a medical pro-
fessional in a hospital or clinical setting.151 First, compared with other
jurisdictions' determinations of who may conduct an investigative blood
draw, the police officer who conducted Johnston's blood draw had suffi-
cient EMT training and experience. 152 Second, while noting that a blood
draw in a medical environment is ideal, a blood draw in a police station
does not necessarily fail the requirement that the blood draw be con-
ducted in a safe place. 153
Finally, the court disagreed with the Fort Worth Court of Appeal's
finding that other circumstances suggested that the blood draw was un-
reasonable: Johnston was alone in the police station with two officers and
the police department "did not have a use-of-force protocol for ... blood
draws.' 1 54 The court stated that the court of appeals erred by failing "to
144. Schmerber v. State, 384 U.S. 757, 777 (1966); accord State v. Johnston, 336 S.W.3d
649, 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 212 (2011).
145. Johnston, 336 S.W.3d at 659-64.
146. Id. at 657-60.
147. Id. at 659.
148. Id. at 660.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 661.
151. Id. at 661-63.
152. Id. at 662.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 663.
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give [due] deference to the trial judge's finding that the officers 'followed
medically accepted procedures in drawing the blood,"' and, moreover,
there was no evidence in the record that the procedures "subjected John-
ston to any additional risk of infection and pain."'1 55 When reviewing the
court of appeal's consideration of the police's use of force, the Court of
Criminal Appeals held "that the reasonable use of physical force to ob-
tain a blood sample is permissible.' '1 56
Johnston is an important case because of its extension of Schmerber to
significantly different circumstances. In Schmerber, blood was drawn
from the defendant by a physician at a hospital,157 whereas in Johnston
blood was drawn by a police officer at a police station. Thus, Johnston
counsels that a blood draw conducted outside of a medical facility and by
a police officer can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The
important considerations for reasonableness when a police officer con-
ducts a blood draw are whether the officer has sufficient training and
whether the officer is conducting the blood draw in accordance with ac-
ceptable medical procedures in a safe place and in a safe manner.
D. CONSENT
Voluntary consent is one exception to the general rule that a warrant-
less entry onto private property is presumptively unreasonable. 58 In Li-
mon v. State,159 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a minor who
answers the door to a private residence may consent to a warrantless en-
try into a private home.160 In Limon, the police responded to a call to
investigate "shots fired."'161 The investigation led one officer to a home
where a boy, who was thirteen or fourteen years old, opened the door.162
The boy gave the officer permission to enter the home where Dennis Li-
mon was later arrested. 163 Limon filed a motion to suppress, arguing that
the officer's entry into the home constituted an unreasonable search.' 64
The trial judge denied the motion, and on direct appeal, the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals held that the trial judge erred in denying Li-
mon's motion.165
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals,166 noting
that consent to search may be given by anyone with actual or apparent
authority to consent and holding that the boy who answered the door had
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758.
158. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
159. Limon v. State, 340 S.W.3d 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
160. Id. at 758-59.
161. Id. at 755.
162. Id. at 756.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 755.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 759.
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apparent authority to consent to police entry into the home. 167 The
court's reasoning for agreeing with the trial judge's ruling was five fold.168
First, the trial judge could have believed that because the boy answered
the door by himself, as opposed to having an adult present, he had a
greater level of authority to permit the officer to enter. 169 Second, the
trial judge "reasonably could have inferred from [the officer]'s testimony
that [the boy] appeared to be at least a teenager of significant matur-
ity.' 70 Third, the boy consented to the officer's entry rather than a full
search of the home.' 7' Fourth, a teenager would be expected to have
authority to permit an officer to enter to perform a public-safety func-
tion. 72 And finally, that the boy answered the door at 2 a.m. suggested
that he was a resident rather than a guest. 173 Based on this reasoning, the
court concluded the boy clearly had apparent authority to consent to the
officer's entry of the home.174
Limon is an important case because it clarifies the law on whether a
minor may consent to a police officer's entry into a private residence.
However, the court conceded that whether the boy had apparent author-
ity to consent would be a closer call if, instead of requesting mere entry,
the officer had requested consent to search the entire home.' 75
In State v. Weaver,'76 the Court of Criminal Appeals provided an ex-
ample where the police exceeded the scope of consent to search. Several
police officers visited Roy Weaver's welding shop to look for a person
wanted in another county. 177 Weaver gave the officers consent to search
for that person, but Weaver refused the officers' request for consent to
search his van.178 One officer then retrieved his drug dog, which re-
sponded to Weaver's passenger door.' 79  The police found
methamphetamine inside Weaver's van. 180 Weaver thereafter was ar-
rested and charged with possession of methamphetamine.' 8 ' The trial
judge suppressed the evidence, concluding that the officers exceeded the
scope of consent to search.182 The Beaumont Court of Appeals
affirmed. 183
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the court of appeals, 8 4 agree-
167, Id. at 756, 758.
168. Id. at 757-58.







176. State v. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d 521, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
177. Id. at 523.
178. Id. at 523-24.
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ing that the police exceeded the scope of consent to search a business
premises for the wanted person.185 The court first laid the legal back-
ground for its analysis, explaining that a commercial property owner may
limit or delimit the scope of his consent to search.186 It then determined
that the record supported an implied finding that the van was not in an
area open to the public and the conclusion that the officers lacked contin-
ued consent to be on the premises when they used the drug dog.187 Re-
garding the officer's use of a drug dog, the court reasoned that a
reasonable person would have understood from Weaver's refusal of con-
sent to search his van that the officers were no longer welcome on the
premises. 18 8 Furthermore, the trial judge could have found that consent
to search for the wanted person had been completed when the police
officers used the drug dog.189
Weaver provides a noteworthy contrast to two recent Court of Criminal
Appeals cases. First, Weaver contrasts with the court's holding in
Valtierra v. State that officers did not exceed the scope of consent to
search an apartment for a missing person because an apparent
resident impliedly consented to a broader scope of search by failing to
object to the officers' further actions. 190 Like the facts of Weaver, the
officers in Valtierra found the property owners in possession of
methamphetamine. 191 The Weaver court discussed and, in two ways, dis-
tinguished Valtierra.192 The officers in Weaver had determined that the
person they were looking for was not on the premises when they found
methamphetamine in Weaver's van, but the Valtierra officers had not
made a similar determination when they found the methamphetamine in
the apartment. 193 Moreover, Weaver's express objection to a further
search of his van foreclosed the possibility of implied consent, which was
not foreclosed by the facts of Valtierra.194
Second, Weaver limited the scope of the court's holding in State v.
Elias.195 The court in Elias remanded the case because the trial judge had
made specific findings of fact but failed to make a finding on a potentially
dispositive fact issue. 196 The Elias court declined to apply the State v.
Ross presumption, 197 to imply fact findings supported by the record be-
cause the better presumptions, when a trial judge has made findings of
fact,
185. Id.
186. Id. at 526-27.
187. Id. at 530.
188. Id. at 530-31.
189. Id. at 531-32.
190. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 449, 451-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
191. Id. at 445.
192. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d at 531.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. State v. Elias, 339 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
196. Id. at 676, 679.
197. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
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[are] that the explicit findings of fact that the trial court did enter
are those it deemed 'essential' to its ruling, and that it made no find-
ing of fact whatsoever with respect to other fact or credibility issues
because it regarded them (however erroneously) as peripheral or
non-essential to its ultimate legal holding. 198
The Weaver majority's response in footnote thirty-four of its opinion to
the dissenting opinions appears to have narrowed Elias's remand require-
ment to cases in which there is a disputed fact issue. 199
E. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
When the police lack express or implied consent to search, they may
nevertheless conduct a warrantless search of a home if they have both
probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify bypassing the warrant
requirement.2 0 0 In 2011, the Supreme Court decided Kentucky v. King,
which rejected an assertion of police-created exigent circumstances. 20 1
The case concerned a sting operation to buy crack cocaine outside of an
apartment complex. 20 2 One officer observed the drug dealer retreat back
to an apartment building and radioed other officers to move in on him.20 3
When the officers arrived at the location where the drug dealer had re-
treated, there were two apartment doors. 20 4 The officers smelled mari-
juana smoke emanating from behind one of the doors. 20 5 They knocked
and announced, "This is the police. °20 6 There was no response to the
officers, but the officers heard movement of people and things inside the
apartment.2 0 7 One officer testified that this led them to believe the drug-
related evidence was about to be destroyed.2 0 8 The police announced
that they were going to enter and then kicked in the door.2 0 9 The officers
found marijuana and cocaine in plain view in Hollis King's apartment. 2 10
The officers later looked in the other apartment and found the drug
dealer for whom they initially searched.2 1 '
King was charged with drug trafficking and moved to suppress the evi-
dence from the warrantless search, but the trial judge denied the mo-
tion.21 2 The intermediate court of appeals affirmed the ruling, but the
Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed.2 13 The supreme court attempted
198. Elias, 339 S.W.3d at 675-76.
199. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d at 528 n.34.
200. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011).
201. Id. at 1862-63.













to determine whether the police impermissibly created the exigency by
announcing a two-part test: first, the police cannot create exigent circum-
stances in bad faith to avoid the warrant requirement; and second, in the
absence of bad faith, the "police may not rely on exigent circumstances if
'it [is] reasonably foreseeable that the police's investigative tactics would
create exigent circumstances.'"214 The supreme court concluded that the
search was impermissible under the second part. 215
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and announced a
different test for claims of police-created exigencies: "the exigent circum-
stances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police
preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense. ' 216 If the police
create an exigency without "engaging in or threatening to engage in con-
duct that violates Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the
destruction of evidence is reasonable.' ' 21 7 As analogous support, the
Court cited the plain-view doctrine (that officers may seize evidence in
plain view if "they have not violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving
at the spot from wh[ere] the observation of evidence is made") and the
consensual encounters doctrine (that "officers may seek consensual en-
counters if they are lawfully present in the area where the consenual en-
counter occurs"). 2 18
The Court also disapproved of several variations of the police-created
exigency doctrine that had developed in federal circuits and state courts,
including considerations of bad faith, reasonable foreseeability, probable
cause and time to secure a warrant, and standard or good investigative
tactics.219 Assuming, without deciding, that exigent circumstances indeed
existed, and applying its interpretation of the police-created exigency
doctrine, the Court then determined that no evidence showed that the
officers either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so
before entering King's apartment.220
The impact of King's holding on Texas case law has already been dis-
puted. In Turrubiate v. State, a panel of justices on the San Antonio
Court of Appeals disagreed on whether King affects the analysis for de-
termining whether exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless
entry into the suspect's home. 221 In Turrubiate, a Child Protective Ser-
vices investigator visited the apartment of Marcos Turrubiate's girlfriend
to respond to a report that marijuana was being used inside the home.222
Turrubiate opened the door, told the investigator that his girlfriend was
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1858, 1863.
217. Id. at 1858.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1858-61.
220. Id. at 1863.
221. Turrubiate v. State, 365 S.W.3d 780, at *6 n.2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Feb. 15,
2012, pet. granted).
222. Id. at 789-90.
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not home, and then closed the door.22 3 After smelling marijuana, the
investigator called the police to accompany him back to the apartment.
2 24
An officer hid outside of the view of the peephole while the investigator
knocked again on the apartment door.22 5 Turrubiate again answered, and
the officer jumped in front of the door and put his arm on the door to
prevent Turrubiate from closing it.22 6 The officer pointed a taser gun at
Turrubiate to ensure compliance.22 7 Once inside the apartment, the of-
ficer found marijuana in Turrubiate's backpack. 228
Despite Turrubiate's motion to suppress, the trial judge admitted the
evidence at trial. 22 9 The court of appeals reversed, holding that even if
the officer had probable cause, he lacked exigent circumstances to enter
Turrubiate's apartment without a warrant.230 The court cited five factors
relevant to a determination that evidence might be destroyed or
removed:
(1) the degree of urgency involved and the amount of time necessary
to obtain a warrant ... ; (2) reasonable belief that the contraband is
about to be removed .. . ; (3) the possibility of danger to police
officers guarding the site of the contraband while a search warrant is
sought ... ; (4) information indicating the possessors of the contra-
band are aware that the police are on their trail ... ; and (5) the
ready destructibility of the contraband and the knowledge that ef-
forts to dispose of narcotics and to escape are characteristic behavior
of persons engaged in the narcotics traffic.
23 1
The only information supporting exigent circumstances was the of-
ficer's bare assertion that after he put his arm on the door, "it was an
issue of destruction of evidence. If there . . . is marijuana in the house, I
have to prevent it from being destroyed. '232 The dissent argued that
under King, the first and third factors were no longer relevant to a deter-
mination of exigent circumstances.2 33 The dissent would have affirmed
the trial judge's ruling on the grounds that the evidence supported an
implied determination that the officer reasonably believed that King
knew that he was under investigation.2 34 Thus, Turrubiate suggests that
King's impact on the exigent circumstances doctrine is in dispute.
223. Id. at 790.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 791.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 791-92.
229. Id. at 781.
230. Id. at 792, 794.
231. Id. at 785 (quoting United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1973)).
232. See id. at 791-92.
233. Id. at 791-92 (Hilbig, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 792-94.
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F. EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Even when the police obtain evidence in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, a criminal defendant is not always entitled to a remedy.
The ordinary remedy is the exclusion of evidence under the exclusionary
rule.235 For the exclusionary rule to be appropriate, however, suppres-
sion must serve to advance the deterrence of Fourth Amendment viola-
tions.236  This outcome usually depends on whether the police
deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence, disregarded Fourth
Amendment protections.237
In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the exclusionary rule will not bar evidence obtained through a search
conducted with objectively reasonable, good-faith reliance on binding ap-
pellate precedent.238 In April 2007, Willie Davis was arrested as a pas-
senger during a traffic stop for giving the police a fake name.2 39 After
handcuffing Davis, the police searched the vehicle and found Davis's
gun.24 0 Davis was charged with possession of a firearm as a felon.241 The
trial judge denied Davis's motion to suppress and Davis was convicted.2 42
While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Arizona v.
Gant,243 which overruled New York v. Belton,244 holding that an automo-
bile search conducted after a suspect had been handcuffed and the area
had been secured was not a proper search incident to a lawful arrest. 245
The Supreme Court held that the officer's reliance upon the binding
circuit precedent at the time was objectively reasonable, and thus applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule did not have any deterrent value. 246 The
Court rejected Davis's argument that Gant applied because the retroac-
tive application of a new rule would not affect the analysis of the proper
application of the exclusionary rule. 247
Davis is significant because retroactive new rules announced by the
Court will not necessarily be favorable to defendants in their efforts to
exclude evidence obtained in violation of the new rule. So long as a po-
lice officer conducts a search or seizure with objectively reasonable,
good-faith reliance on binding appellate precedent, Davis prevents the
application of the exclusionary rule. 248
235. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423 (2011).
236. Id. at 2426.
237. Id. at 2427.
238. Id. at 2429.
239. Id. at 2425.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 2425-26.
242. Id. at 2426.
243. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
244. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
245. Gant, 556 U.S. at 350; accord Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2424-25, 2431.
246. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429.
247. Id. at 2430-31.
248. Id. at 2429.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Over the past year, the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals considered various aspects of the law related to confessions,
searches, and seizures. Recent decisions by these courts present few
changes to the well-established precedent in these areas.
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